Friday, March 25, 2011

The Bad and the Ugly

Finally, the EU managed to find a decision on the ESM (as well as an overhauled stability pact and increased economic monitoring and surveillance measures). Coupled with the already agreed enlargement of the effective lending capacity of the temporary EFSF (as well as a broadening of its mandate), this is a significant step forward for the Euro project. I would have preferred if the EFSF would have been allowed to be buying government debt in the secondary market but overall, the measures are going in the right direction and show that the political support for the Euro remains strong. I am convinced that these steps reduce the risk of a systemic breakdown of the Eurozone (i.e. a break-up). Additionally, it seems that markets are starting to perceive a similar picture as correlations between peripheral government bond spreads to Bunds have been falling since early this month.
The chart below shows that Portuguese and Irish spreads continued to widen. This should not come as a big surprise given all the negative news out of Portugal (collapse of the government, significant rating downgrades) which renders a bail-out very likely and the ongoing problems in the Irish banking sector, a lack of agreement about a potential cut in the interest rate of the bail-out loans and the absence of the ECB in the secondary market. On the other side, spreads of Italian and Spanish bonds have tightened considerably.

The bad and the ugly: Italy/Spain diverge from Portugal/Ireland
Source: Bloomberg

This is probably down to an improved growth outlook for the Spanish as swell as Italian economies (it has also been mirrored in equity markets where the Spanish IBEX and the Italian MIB index show the largest year-to-date gains besides Greece). Also in the case of Spain, it seems that the austerity measures taken by the government over the past two years as well as the steps to bail-out the banking sector are starting to help restore confidence. Moreover, it suggests that contagion from a likely Portugal bail-out should prove minimal. This is not only a great development for Spain - which has been frequently cited as a likely bail-out candidate following Portugal - but for the entire Eurozone. Additionally, given the size of the Spanish bond market, a self-reinforcing widening cycle (and a likely bail-out) would have caused tremendous losses on the already weak European banking sector.
Finally, these developments are support my notion that for peripheral bond yields it is much more important what the EFSF does/how the liquidity situation evolves, than whether the ECB hikes its repo rate. 10y Spanish government bond yields have fallen by some 50bp since mid January. To be sure a 5% 10y rate is still restrictive for the Spanish economy, however, it is less restrictive and as such will help the economy to stabilise and the sovereign to reduce the budget on the margin. Furthermore, as spread volatility drops, more buyers might be enticed back into investing in Spanish bonds, with the potential of establishing a positive feedback loop (lower yields=better for the deficit and the economy=improving fundamentals=lower credit risk=more bond buyers=lower yields). At the short end, the situation is similar and 2y yields fell 60bp over the past two months.
As a sidenote, these developments support the case for an early ECB rate hike. Furthermore, I expect Spanish and Italian bonds to perform further vs. Bunds over the medium term. Therefore, my expectations for the development of monetary policy remain the same as they have been since early this year:

Policy tool

Direction

Expected stance

Repo rate (ECB)

Higher

Less accommodative

Liquidity provision (ECB)

Unchanged

Ample liquidity

Peripheral bond yields (EFSF)

Lower

Less restrictive

Monday, March 7, 2011

Is EMU really bad for the periphery?

Much has been written about the inability of the PIGS countries to adjust wihin EMU as they cannot devalue their currency vs. their most important trading partners (i.e. the other EMU members). This has frequently been given as a reason why these countries should or might leave the Eurozone. Should they leave, they can then significantly devalue their new currencies and growth will re-appear. I have previously argued that devaluation without default does not help as these countries suffer from the combination of a lack in competitiveness as well as an over-indebtedness problem. Just leaving the euro would make the over-indebtedness issue much worse (as the debts would remain re-denominated in the euro). But leaving the euro and defaulting would cause serious havoc on the financial sector as well as the sovereign.
Furthermore, a weaker currency alone does not guarantee an improved export performance. The chart below compares the evolution of the trade balance for PIGS as well as Iceland and the UK. The Icelandic Koruna has collapsed dramatically and indeed the Icelandic trade balance improved very sharply. However, also GBP weakened significantly in trade-weighted terms since the start of the financial crisis (in fact GBP weakened by approx. 20% vs. the Euro compared to 2007). But UK net exports have not moved significantly. Rather the trade deficit widened slightly. This is in sharp contrast to the development in the trade balance of Portugal, Spain, Greece and especially Ireland. As can be seen from the chart, the Irish trade balance improved by more than 10% of GDP and thereby helped to stabilise the Irish economy. Furthermore, also the Spanish, Greek and Portuguese trade developments provide support to GDP! So, yes as Iceland shows, a much weaker currency can help but as the UK shows, it does not need to be the case. More importantly as the PIGS show, even with a stable currency (the trade-weighted euro is at the same level as in 2007), trade developments can provide a significant positive impetus.
Development of the trade balance/net exports as a % of GDPSource: Eurostat

Another important topic is the development of unemployment. Yes, especially Spanish and Irish unemployment rates are extremely high. However, my opinion is that this is mainly a functiion of the previous construction bubble.
The chart below shows the relative size of the construction sector (i.e. construction employment relative to total employment) at the peak of the bubble vs. the latest unemployment rate. Clearly it is not a perfect fit, but with an R2 larger than 60% it is quite good. In general, the larger the previous construction bubble, the higher current unemployment. This should not come as such a surprise as construction is usually very much a domestic sector (i.e. within construction exports and imports are not that important). In turn, once a construction bubble bursts, a lot of people will get unemployed in the domestic economy (because there are not many construction imports), even with a sharply weaker currency (because there are not many construction exports). As these people get unemployed, domestic demand is weakened and employment drops as well in other sectors.

The larger the previous construction bubble, the higher current unemployment rates

Source: Research Ahead, Statistics Iceland, Eurostat

Overall, the development in net exports for the PIGS countries is encouraging so far. To expect that unemployment - especially in Spain and Ireland - would drop fast if they had their own much weaker currency seems illusionary given the size of the previous construction bubble. Once such a bubble bursts, the costs must be borne and can not be exported away. EMU does not seem to be the main problem for PIGS.
While the developments in Iceland seem encouraging as net exports have grown significantly amid the sharply weaker currency which has also helped to keep unemployment down, the situation in the UK raises a warning flag. Net exports are not rising despite a weaker currency and the only effect seems to be to raise inflation, thereby eroding living standards.
I remain of the opinion that the Eurozone will rebalance over a 3-5 year timeframe with a relatively high real growth rate and high inflation in the north-eastern economies while the PIGS will suffer from relatively low real growth and limited inflation.

Thursday, March 3, 2011

The Hawks have landed

I have been of the view that the ECB would start its next rate hiking cycle by June (see A higher ECB repo rate by June dated Feb. 2). At today's press conference, ECB president Trichet not only mentioned that the inflation risks have moved to the upside - which was largely expected - he also stated that growth risks have become balanced (from downside growth risks). Furthermore, he stated that "strong vigilance" would be warranted, usually a code word that the repo rate will be hiked at the next meeting (which Trichet confirmed when he said that a rate hike was possible at the next meeting, though not certain). In turn, my hawkish view of the ECB has been confirmed. The record low level of the repo rate of 1% was set during the height of the financial crisis and amid deflationary risks. This is just not the case anymore and starting a rate hiking cycle is fully warranted. The inflation as well as the growth environment (as well as monetary developments) suggest that rates should gradually rise over the next 2 years. I expect rates to move to around 2.5% by the end of Q1 2012 and 3% by the end of 2012.


My basic views still hold:

Policy tool

Direction

Expected stance

Repo rate (ECB)

Higher

Less accommodative

Liquidity provision (ECB)

Unchanged

Ample liquidity

Peripheral bond yields (EFSF)

Lower

Less restrictive