Tuesday, April 23, 2013

What is happening with Germany?

Long-time readers will know that I have held an upbeat view with respect to Germany for a long time due to a number of reasons. One of the reasons has been the easy monetary environment provided by record low real yields (ongoing) as well as by the weak exchange rate. More important for Germany than the level of the trade-weighted Euro is the level of the EURJPY cross rate even though Germany does not have strong direct trade relationships with Japan. However, Germany and Japan are key competitors in the global markets for items such as cars, machines or chemicals. The collapse of EURJPY since the outburst of the financial crisis in 2008 has helped German exporters gain market share, especially in Asian markets, at the expense of their Japanese counterparts. Following the radical easing in monetary policy by the BoJ, EURJPY has shot upwards by approx. 30% within a matter of a few months.
EURJPY and EUR trade-weighted index

Source: Bloomberg 

This has important implications, not only for the German economy but also for the Eurozone overall:
a) The sharp rise in EURJPY constitutes a net tightening the monetary environment for Germany. German exporters are likely to face a more challenging export environment, especially in Asian markets. This will render the current economic upswing softer than would be the case otherwise.
b) The sharp rise in EURJPY does not have significant tightening effects on the other Eurozone economies, most notably France and the periphery. These economies compete to a much lower extent with Japanese exporters in world markets and hence a higher EURJPY is no issue. Rather, the likely flow of capital out of Japan (as the BoJ reduces the amount of JGBs available for private investors and hence cash needs to be invested elsewhere, likely also in Eurozone bond markets) helps to depress the yields of semi-core and peripheral sovereign bonds. Hence, the monetary environment in the periphery/semi-core gets more accommodative.
c) A weaker-than-expected state of the German economy increases the chances of further easing steps by the ECB (repo rate cut, moving into the direction of forward guidance, unconventional steps to promote the flow of credit to SMEs), supporting growth in the periphery via lower yields and a lower Euro (on a trade-weighted basis).

Overall, the German economy should see a growth recovery but a slower one than would have been the case otherwise whereas the support provided by the monetary environment for the periphery has been increasing and will increase further. As a result, growth differences between various Eurozone countries should become less pronounced.

Tuesday, April 16, 2013

Rising deflation risks in the Eurozone

I argued in November (see: No inflation pressures in the Eurozone) that inflation fears for the Eurozone are unfounded and rather deflationary risks in the periphery are significant. In the meantime headline and core inflation rates have fallen below the 2% target level. However, inflation pressures have continued to ease and inflation rates should be expected to fall markedly further to below 1% during summer.

The chart below shows the development of various inflation measures for the Eurozone. Headline and core inflation are well known. However, I also calculated a core measure ex administered goods and services. The price changes for administered goods & services are to a large extent directed by the sovereigns and amid the massive fiscal tightening in a large number of countries there has been significant upward pressure on the administered goods prices. Furthermore, I try to deduct also the effects of changes of consumption taxes on prices (Eurostat publishes a constant tax rate HICP). The green line shows this adjusted core inflation measure (i.e. a measure of inflation stripped off the effects of energy&food prices as well as the direct impact of fiscal tightening). This inflation measure stood at 0.4% in January. At that time, core inflation was at 1.3%. Hence, two-thirds of core inflation stemmed from higher prices for administered goods & services as well as higher consumption taxes. On a country level Spain is in outright deflation and France is at 0% inflation according to this measure.

Inflation developments in the Eurozone 

Source: Eurostat, ResearchAhead

Looking ahead, price pressures should ease markedly further. First, as headline inflation has been running above the core measures, prices for food & energy continued to exert upward pressure on inflation. However, as the chart below shows, Brent crude oil in Euros has already dropped by approx. 15% since early February and from where they stood a year ago. This is the largest yoy drop in oil prices since 2009 (i.e. at the height of the global financial crisis). Following a spike of approx. 40% last summer, also food prices (measured by the S&P GSCI Agriculture Index in Euros) have now turned negative on a yoy basis. As a result, the inflationary impact of food&energy prices should wane over the next months and headline inflation should fall to (and might even undershoot) the core inflation rate.

Year-over-year %-change of Brent crude oil in Euros

Source: Bloomberg

However, besides easing headline pressures, also core inflation rates should continue to fall further. For one, unused capacity in the Eurozone is at extremely high levels. Moreover, monetary developments remain very weak and M3 grew by only 3.1% yoy in February with the 6m annualised increase only at 2.1%. Within M3, M1 continues to be the main driver for M3 growth, while the broader aggregates continue to shrink. The 6m annualised change in M3-M2 has collapsed to -20% in February! As the chart below shows, growth in M3-M2 is a good leading indicator for core inflation and suggests that inflation pressures have been easing further. On the other side, credit growth remains very weak also, falling by 1.2% yoy in February. In Spain, loans for corporates are collapsing by almost 20% yoy and to households by 5%. But also in Italy, loan growth is negative while in Germany it stands at only 0% for corporates and 1% for households.

Growth in M3-M2 suggests easing core inflation pressures


Source: Eurostat, ResearchAhead

As a result, the combination of weaker energy and food prices on a year-over-year basis as well as very high unused capacity and very weak money and loan growth all suggest that core and headline inflation rates should fall markedly over the next few months. Sub 1% inflation rates during summer are very likely and should raise deflation fears. 

Wednesday, February 27, 2013

Investing along national lines should continue to pay off



I have a new blog written in German which focuses on developments in the German economy as well as German economic policy matters: http://tanzueberdemabgrund.wordpress.com/.


I have been convinced that the multi-year outlook for various developed market economies is very different and accordingly investing along national lines should pay off. This has been the case ever since the financial crisis broke out and country views should continue to guide investment decisions for the next few years.  

Germany: I have been looking for Germany to outperform for quite some time (see for example: There is more to celebrate for Germany dated Nov 10, 2009). Germany enjoys an easy monetary environment amid record low real yields and a relatively high credit availability. Furthermore, at current exchange rate levels, German corporates can continue to gain market share. The fiscal deficit poses no threat and amid ongoing growth, sovereign debt levels can fall. Hence, no fiscal tightening is necessary. Additionally, some of the factors which held growth back since the mid 90s have disappeared or reversed (most notably a large drop in public sector employment, a sharp  drop in construction activity and declining immigration). Public sector employment has been stabilising, construction has been growing again and immigration is on the rise. These factors mean that while average/trend growth was depressed between 1995-2009, it can increase again. Risks for the German economy stem mainly from the political side. Following the elections in autumn this year, the political landscape might change towards a less economy friendly environment (higher taxes, more regulation).
Austria & Belgium: The financial crisis/ Eurozone sovereign crisis has burdened Austria & Belgium especially via their banking sectors. However, the stabilisation in Eastern Europe, the liquidity provision measures by the ECB, most notably the 3y LTROs, and the systemic backdrop provided by the OMTs and the ESM have significantly reduced the banking woes in these countries. Furthermore, fiscal deficits do not pose a threat as the primary balance is close to 0% in both cases. With the help of the very low sovereign bond yields, fiscal deficits should remain under control with no further savings measures necessary and debt-GDP ratios should be able to shrink over the medium term. Hence, Austria and Belgium profit from an easy monetary and neutral fiscal environment and do not suffer from significant structural problems. Their sovereign bonds should do relatively well vs. the rest of the semi-core markets over the longer term.

However, there is a large group of Eurozone countries which faces a difficult longer-term environment. Greece, Portugal and Spain continue to face adjustment recessions to restore competitiveness and reduce fiscal deficits which will restrain growth. But also Italy, France and the Netherlands find themselves in a difficult position. Italy and France need to restore competitiveness of their industrial sector and both economies suffer from very rigid labour markets. In the case of Italy, political uncertainty has been rising amid the election gridlock. As Italy has a large primary surplus, it does not need more fiscal austerity. Rather structural reforms are needed to restore competitiveness and increase trend growth. France, on the other side, needs more fiscal savings measure to bring back the deficit and stabilise debt-GDP ratios. The combination of a lack of competitiveness for the private sector coupled with significant and ongoing austerity measures will depress French growth for quite some time. In the case of the Netherlands, the private sector is over-indebted. Given that unemployment has risen from 5% in mid 2011 to 7,5% in January this year and as the housing market has entered a correction (house prices are down by 9,6% yoy in January), consumer spending should be weak going forward and also hold back business investment. Furthermore, the state needs to lower its fiscal deficit which will only aggravate the cyclical downturn. The short-term outlook for Greece Portugal, Spain, France and the Netherlands is for weak growth, the longer-term outlook remains most challenging for France (as so far they have not done anything to restore competitiveness). In the case of Italy, the situation is uncertain. Amid the political gridlock, political and hence economic uncertainty is rising. This should have a negative effect on business investment and households' consumption of durable goods. On the other side, should a relatively stable government be formed, then Italy could move back to low but positive growth. Most likely such a new government will not be able to drive through more austerity measures (which are not necessary anyhow) and significant structural reforms (which would be necessary). The net effect would be that Italy should be able to move back to a low but positive growth environment over the course of this year.

Elsewhere in Europe, I have been bearish on the UK economy for a long time (see for example: Revisiting the UK: not much good news dated August 18, 2009 ). The UK is suffering from the weakness in the financial sector where its economy is highly exposed. Furthermore, the UK’s oil sector output has dropped by approx. a quarter over the past four years and is in steady decline. Aggravated by the government’s savings measures, the economy has been failing to grow. Furthermore, while the trade-weighted GBP has dropped by approx. 20% since before the financial crisis, this was not mirrored by an improvement in the current account. Rather to the contrary, the current account deficit is larger than before the crisis and the weaker GBP was mostly reflected in higher inflation. A further easing in the monetary environment will only result in another weakening of GBP and in the end, the BoE will be almost the only net-buyer of Gilts. Ultimately, the BoE will be holding these Gilts forever (or cancel them with the Treasury). Hence, the money created by the quantitative easing measures should be seen as a permanent increase in base money and is unlikely to be absorbed again.

In the US, the situation is very different. While the fiscal deficit is relatively high and the Fed continues to conduct QE as well, the situation of the economy is much more favourable. The economy has recovered the lost output from the financial crisis. A key driver might be the increasing oil & gas output which also puts significant downward pressure on the current account deficit. Furthermore, the housing market has turned the corner. If the politicians don’t overdo it with fiscal tightening, then the economy should soon find its way back into a higher growth environment which then will also depress the deficit. Hence, I am optimistic with respect to medium-term outlook for the US economy (though in the near-term, economic data might disappoint amid the fiscal tightening).